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XENOPHON’S VIRTUE PERSONIFIED
Some elements in man’s nature make for friendship. […] For thanks to their virtue 
(διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετήν) these prize the untroubled security of moderate possessions 
above sovereignty won by war; despite hunger and thirst, they can share their food 
and drink without a pang; and although they delight in the charms of beauty they 
can resist the lure and avoid offending those whom they should respect (Xenophon, 
Mem. 2.6.21-22, Socrates on friendship) 1.
In the above quotation Socrates explains to Critobulus that friendship is created and 
sustained through the virtues of friends. Virtue (arete) is said to enable friendship; 
but it is described in terms that, as we shall see, are not case-specific but common 
to all instances of arete in Xenophon’s writings: in other places it is security or 
self-preservation which is gained through virtue, which is described as moderation, 
endurance, and self restraint. This paper explores these constituents of virtue as 
leading to specific excellences (in this case, to excellence in friendship), and in a 
wider perspective, to happiness.
A very noticeable difference between Plato and Xenophon is that while Plato 
is constantly deliberating the essence of virtue, Xenophon provides several lists of 
virtues but does not ponder the essence of virtue as such 2. These lists exist, e. g. in 
Agesilaus 5, 6 and 10 3, Memorabilia 1.2, 4.2, 4.5, 4.7 and 4.8, Cyropaedia 7.5 and 
Cynegeticus 12-13, and consist in the virtues of: self-rule (enkrateia), temperance 
1. All the English translations of Xenophon’s works are due to E.C. Marchant (Agesilaus, Constitution 
of Lacedaemonians, Cynegeticus, Memorabilia): cf. Marchant 1923 and Marchant 1925, except 
Cyropaedia, cf. Miller 1914.
2. We do find instances where Xenophon is exploring the special virtues that mark great leaders, 
e. g. in Ages. a similar trend appears in Xenophon’s treatment of charis – cf. Azoulay 2004, 10. Xen., 
Ages. 3.1: “But now I will attempt to show the virtue that was in his soul (τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ 
ἀρετήν), the virtue through which he wrought those deeds and loved all that is honourable and 
put away all that is base”. See pp. 144-145 below.
3. Ages. 5.1-3 resembles Mem. 2.1.1-6 in praising the good ruler’s temperance in the matters of food, 
drink, sexual desire, bearing heat and cold, rejection of idleness and propensity to – and even 




(sophrosune), persistent care (epimeleia), willingness to toil, and also piety, courage 
and wisdom. While these lists are not identical, they do contain a common core of 
the above three elements. From comparing these lists it will transpire that they are 
usually intended to show the good traits of a leader (Cyrus, Agesilaus) or philoso-
pher (Socrates) and that the virtues listed slightly vary with the subject matter (e. 
g. friendship, warfare or leadership) 4.
How is virtue described in Xenophon’s writings ? L.A. Dorion’s work on 
Xenophon’s enkrateia as a foundational Xenophonic virtue 5 and recent research 
on Xenophon’s ethics as pertaining to utility and usefulness 6, seems to have set 
the general opinion on Xenophon’s virtues as belonging in one or both of these 
categories. What I would like to show here is that in an important passage on 
virtue, Memorabilia 2.1.22-33, where Socrates tells a tale on virtue and vice 7, Virtue 
is personified as a mythological lady who lists her own traits; even though enkrateia 
is discussed and praised by the personified Virtue, there seems to be equal emphasis 
on sophrosune, epimeleia, propensity to toil and piety as primary constituents of 
virtue, which are rewarded by eudaimonia. I shall henceforth examine the personified 
Arete in Mem. 2.1 as a single whole made up of several necessary and some optional 
constituents; these constituents of arete will be compared with other instances 
of the term in Xenophon’s writings to see if they fit in this category. From this 
examination it will become clear that virtue is a group of excellences aimed mainly 
at inner strength and self preservation and consisting of enkrateia, sophrosune and 
epimeleia, and to a lesser degree – courage and wisdom. These constituents both 
create and maintain virtue as a whole, and should be exercised persistently through 
4. Of special interest is the heroic portrait of the hunter in Cynegeticus who is neither leader nor 
philosopher; this is an exception to a common conception of Xenophon’s writing as aimed at 
glorification of individual heroes, and may indicate that Xenophon was more concerned with the 
substance of virtue than with the particular people displaying it. An example for this common 
conception in Gray 2011, 5: “Xenophon’s works offer us ’mirrors of princes’ that seem to reflect 
positive images of the relations between leaders and followers that he presents as the secret to 
success in any community”. The book’s main motivation, however, as stated in the introduction 
(p. 1) and exemplified in chapter 4 (pp. 179-245) is to present Xenophon’s praise of leadership in 
various forms, and not that of individual heroes.
5. E. g. “The Nature and Status of Sophia in the Memorabilia”, Dorion 2012, 474-5: “[…] self mastery 
is the fundamental basis of virtue […]. In this one sees again that enkrateia takes precedence over 
sophia in the moral thinking of Xenophon’s Socrates”. 
6. E. g. Danzig 2012, 508: “In the rest of Xenophon’s writings there are numerous signs that he approves 
wholeheartedly of the pursuit of self-interest. Xenophon frequently praises Socrates for benefiting 
his friends. […] If that is worthy of praise, then the successful pursuit of self-interest must be a 
good thing”.
7. Prodicus’ tale; on the authenticity of the tale see p. 140 below. For a short description of the history 
of personifications of virtue from Hesiod to Aristotle, see Bowra 1938, 187-188. 
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the physical practice of endurance and toil and the mental practice of exaltation in 
endurance and toil 8. The reward of this practice is happiness 9.
Virtue, as we shall see, is created and maintained through effort and a positive 
attitude to effort. It has divine connotations as the mythic Virtue in Mem. 2.1.32 
proclaims herself as being in “company with gods and good men” and has the power 
to give happiness 10. In almost all cases observed, piety is a precondition to virtuous 
conduct 11 – this may be connected with the commitment one must assume when 
following in the path of virtue. This sense of commitment will be shown to be central 
in the mythic Virtue tale in Mem. 2.1 and in the poetic quotations preceding it.
The central motivation in Mem. 2.1 is Socrates’ exhortation of his followers to 
the practice of enkrateia in bodily pleasures, endurance, and toil 12. Aristippus is 
chosen as an interlocutor as he is undisciplined in these efforts. After discussing 
the nature of proper education for leadership (archein), Socrates and Aristippus 
agree that leadership is essentially connected with endurance and temperance in 
regard to basic needs. When Socrates asks Aristippus to choose between the life of 
rulers or slaves, Aristippus proposes a third path – not of ruling or being ruled, but 
a kind of freedom which leads to eudaimonia (Mem. 2.1.11). As we shall see later in 
the section – the road to be taken for reaching happiness will be that of virtue, and 
it will achieve a kind of freedom – not the freedom from effort and from society 
which Aristippus seeks, but freedom from destructive desires and idleness. Socrates 
replies to Aristippus’ third path by arguing for its implausibility – living in the 
world means living in society, and society means rulers and slaves or stronger and 
8. In Mem. 2.1.18 Socrates claims that those who endure willingly enjoy ponos through the comfort 
of hope: “Besides, he who endures willingly enjoys his work because he is comforted by hope”; in 
Ages. 5.3 the virtuous king is described as exalting in ponos: “Agesilaus gloried in hard work”. 
9. I agree with O. Chernyakhovskaya’s general definition of Xenophon’s virtue as the knowledge of 
useful means to arrive at happiness. See Chernyakhovskaya 2014, 105: “Protoutilitaristische und 
eudämonistische Merkmale der Ethik des Xenophontischen Sokrates zeigen sich in seinen Urteilen, 
dass jeder Mensch nach seinem Glück strebt und dass die Tugend als Wissen vom Nützlichen ein 
Mittel zur Erreichung des Glückes ist”. 
10. In a more extreme example (Cyn. 12.21) virtue becomes a deity with the powers to punish and 
reward. See Cygeneticus, p. 147 below. 
11. Some lists of virtues begin with piety, e. g. the description of Socrates’ virtues in the ending lines of 
Memorabilia (4.8.11): “So religious (eusebes) that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so 
just (dikaios) that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits 
on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled (enkrates) that he never chose the pleasanter rather 
than the better course; so wise (phronimos) that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and 
the worse, and needed no counsellor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them”.
12. Mem. 2, 1, 1: ἐδόκει δέ μοι καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων προτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας ἀσκεῖν ἐγκράτειαν [πρὸς 
ἐπιθυμίαν] βρωτοῦ καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ λαγνείας καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ῥίγους καὶ θάλπους καὶ πόνου.
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weaker 13; this is another proof that for Xenophon’s Socrates, by contrast to Plato’s in 
Phaedo, virtue and happiness are connected with life within society 14. It seems that 
for Xenophon’s Socrates virtue is mandatory for self preservation of the individual 
in society (for example, in Mem. 2.1.4 those who are not educated in enkrateia are 
compared to animals falling for bait and being caught), while for the Socrates of 
Phaedo virtue facilitates a better life after death 15.
Socrates now turns to examples from old, quoting from Hesiod, Epicharmus 
and Prodicus on the path of virtue toward happiness. The quotation from Hesiod 
provides an example on the divine role of toil as a main constituent of virtue: “[…] 
in front of virtue the gods immortal have put sweat: long and steep is the path to her 
and rough at first; but when you reach the top, then at length the road is easy, hard 
though it was” (Mem. 2.1.20, quoting form Works and Days 290). Two themes here 
are of interest: there is a steep road leading to virtue, meaning one has to commit 
oneself to hardship in order to become virtuous; when reaching virtue, the road 
becomes easy – this may not only mean that after accomplishing a task the efforts 
seem easier than they seemed to be while taken, but that these efforts become easier 
when the road to virtue is taken again. In other words, the road to virtue is not one 
single path with a prize at its end, it is an ongoing commitment one must take and the 
same efforts should be taken over and over again, only that they become easier with 
the practice of body and mind. Prodicus’ tale 16 which follows describes the youthful 
13. Mem. 2.1.12: “If only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something 
in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and 
do not choose to truckle to the rulers – I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making 
the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves”.
14. Mem. 2.1.4: “Don’t you think that with this education he will be less likely to be caught by his enemy 
than other creatures ? Some of them, you know, are so greedy that in spite of extreme timidity in 
some cases, they are drawn irresistibly to the bait to get food, and are caught; and others are snared 
by drink”.
15. E. g. Socrates’ words in Phaedo 82a-84b: “Then, said he, the happiest of those, and those who go to 
the best place, are those who have practised, by nature and habit, without philosophy or reason, 
the social and civil virtues which are called moderation and justice ? […] those who truly love 
wisdom refrain from all bodily desires and resist them firmly and do not give themselves up to 
them, […] for the soul of the philosopher would not reason as others do, […] and in this way it 
believes it must live, while life endures, and then at death pass on to that which is akin to itself and 
of like nature, and be free from human ills” (English translation by Fowler 1914).
16. Sansone 2004 argues that Xenophon’s Socrates was accurate in quoting from Prodicus’ source. 
I agree with L.A. Dorion who opposes this view by showing that the virtues listed by the personified 
Virtue are typically Xenophontic (Dorion 2008); furthermore, a similar reference to the contents 
of the tale is given in the words of Cyrus to his people in Cyr. 2.2.24 (see p. 145 below), without 
mentioning Prodicus as a source. I find it most probable that a tale of this sort did exist by the 
authorship of Prodicus, but it was revised by Xenophon to fit Socrates’ intentions in Mem. 2.1. 
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Heracles (a symbol of external arete) 17 sitting in a quiet place and pondering his 
ways in life, suddenly approached by two lady personifications of Virtue and Vice, 
each presenting her qualities and inviting him to follow in her path. Virtue exudes 
nobility, purity and modesty: “fair to see and of high bearing; and her limbs were 
adorned with purity, her eyes with modesty; sober was her figure, and her robe was 
white” (Mem. 2.1.22). From their first encounter it is evident that Vice is interested 
in self indulging and external beauty: “plump and soft […] dressed so as to disclose 
all her charms”. Her eyes are “wide open” to the world, while Virtue’s are “modest”, 
probably gazing inward 18. When seeing Heracles, Virtue waits patiently for Vice to 
finish her eager speech, walks steadily to him, and says (among other things): “I hope 
that, if you take the road that leads to me, you will turn out a right good doer of high 
and noble deeds, and I shall be yet more highly honoured and more illustrious for the 
blessings I bestow. […] For of all things good and fair, the gods give nothing to man 
without toil and effort” (Mem. 2.1.27-28). Interestingly, Virtue talks about a reflexive 
effect in which she herself will benefit if Heracles follows her road. Virtue seems in this 
respect to have the divine dimension of thriving on human commitment and piety.
Virtue finishes this speech with the victory she provides – that of mind over 
body: “if you want your body to be strong, you must accustom your body to be the 
servant of your mind, and train it with toil and sweat” (Mem. 2.1.28). Again, this 
victory is achieved with hard effort, and has a continuous character – the training 
is unceasing, there is no real rest from virtue. After a short response by Vice, Virtue 
continues with describing her engagement in the good deeds of men: “But I company 
with gods and good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. 
I am first in honour among the gods and among men that are akin to me […]” 
(Mem. 2.1.32). She ends her speech with the joyous reward of virtue, not only in the 
physical products of toil, but in rejoicing the practice of virtue itself: “The young 
rejoice to win the praise of the old; the elders are glad to be honoured by the young; 
with joy they recall their deeds past, and their present well-doing is joy to them, 
for through me they are dear to the gods, lovely to friends, precious to their native 
land” (Mem. 2.1.33). Her last words to Heracles are a promise for eudaimonia: “if 
thou wilt labour earnestly on this wise, thou mayest have for your own the most 
blessed happiness” (Mem. 2.1.33) 19.
17. Smith 2001, basing on Adkins 1960, e. g. 30-46, traces the development of Greek virtue in a tension 
between the Homeric arete as external excellence and justice, and marks Socrates and his followers’ 
aim at defining arete as an internal rather than external trait bringing excellence about. There is 
very little mention of Xenophon’s arete in Adkins (e. g. 337-339), and none at all in Smith.
18. On the visual depiction of Prodicus’ Arete as a modest maiden and its parallel in Aristotle’s poem 
on Areta (Fr. 4 Diehl) see Bowra 1938, 187.
19. Eudaimonia is described by Virtue as the prized happiness of the virtuous individual. V.J. Gray in her 
recent article Xenophon’s Eudaimonia (Gray 2013, n. 1) lists two meanings in which Xenophon uses 
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The personified Virtue in Mem. 2.1 gives several instructions for following in 
her path: the willingness to toil and effort as means to achieve physical rewards and 
the controlling of mind over body (2.1.28), the shunning of idleness and gluttony 
(2.1.29-31), the awareness to her essence as a mediator between gods and men (2.1.32) 
and the enjoyment of simple joys and the joy gained by living a life of virtue (2.1.33). 
In order to classify Memorabilia’s Arete as a Xenophontic category for virtues, we 
shall now look for other instances of aretai in the Xenophontic corpus, and see if 
they are compatible with this category.
The plural aretai appears once in Mem. 2.6.39, continuing the line quoted 
at the outset of this paper in discussing virtue in the context of friendship: “[…] 
and you have made up your mind that a man’s virtue (ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν) consists in 
outdoing his friends in kindness and his enemies in mischief”(2.6.35); “you will find 
on reflection that every kind of virtue named among men (ὅσαι δ᾽ ἐν ἀνθρώποις 
ἀρεταί) is increased by study and practise” (2.6.39). Here we find arete in the context 
of friendship and utility 20, and aretai as a category of excellences which should 
be trained and practiced (μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτῃ), very much in agreement with 
the words of Virtue on practice, e. g. Mem. 2.1.28: “[…] if you essay to grow great 
through war and want power to liberate your friends and subdue your foes, you 
must learn the arts of war from those who know them and must practise their right 
use (παρὰ τῶν ἐπισταμένων μαθητέον καὶ ὅπως αὐταῖς δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀσκητέον)”. 
Through this example we see that the essence of virtue does not change when it 
regards different arts, e. g. friendship or war. It is the continuous study and practice 
that characterizes virtue, and not the designated goal in the different arts (a good 
friend, victory in war, etc.).
Another instance of arete in the plural appears in Constitution of the Lacedae-
monians:
Again, the following surely entitles the work of Lycurgus to high admiration. He 
observed that where the cult of virtue is left to voluntary effort, the virtuous are 
not strong enough to increase the fame of their fatherland. So he compelled 
all men at Sparta to practise all the virtues (πάσας ἀσκεῖν τὰς ἀρετάς) in public 
life. And therefore, just as private individuals differ from one another in virtue 
according as they practise or neglect it, so Sparta, as a matter of course, surpasses 
the term eudaimonia in Mem. 2.1: 2.1.11 where it is connected with freedom, and 2.1.17 as connected 
with the art of ruling. Happiness in Virtue’s speech (lines 22-33) would be in line with these two 
meanings – it is gained by self leadership and freedom from desires. The happiness promised by 
Virtue contradicts the false eudaimonia as perceived by Vice’s friends in Mem. 2.1.26: “’My friends 
call me Happiness,’ she said, ’but among those that hate me I am nicknamed Vice’”.
20. For general survey of classical treatments of friendship as connected with selflessness or altruism, 
see Konstan 1998, 282. On the utility of friendship in Mem. see Dorion 2013, 218, for instance. 
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all other states in virtue, because she alone makes a public duty of gentlemanly 
conduct” 21.
Here again we see a clear statement that virtue is essentially connected with 
practice – Sparta surpasses other states in virtue because of its extreme disciplinary 
education and military systems which are based on hard training. Since all virtues 
are united in hard work and continual practice, we may safely regard hard work 
and practice as the essence of all the virtues.
We shall now examine the appearances of “arete” in singular, in the following 
works: Mem. 1.2, 3.2, Ages. 3, 10, Cyr. 1.5, 2.2, 7.5 and Cyn. 12.
Memorabilia
Mem. 1.2 describes Socrates’ virtues against the accusations that he was corrupting 
the youth; Xenophon explains that Socrates’ aim was taking care of virtue (1.2.8: 
τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλεια). Virtue in lines 19-20 of this section is described as a quality 
to be trained and worked upon (askein):
I notice that as those who do not train (ἀσκοῦντας) the body cannot perform the 
functions proper to the body, so those who do not train the soul cannot perform 
the functions of the soul […]. For this cause fathers try to keep their sons, even if 
they are prudent (σώφρονες) lads, out of bad company: for the society of honest 
men is a training in virtue (ἄσκησιν οὖσαν τῆς ἀρετῆς), but the society of the bad 
is virtue’s undoing.
Virtue is treated here as an acquired rather than inherent quality; while the 
children may be sophrones by nature, they can be corrupted if their society does not 
exhibit virtue. The preceding line discusses askein as essential for the well being of 
body and soul – probably facilitating virtue.
In Mem. 3.2, Socrates discusses the greatness of leaders in their attentive care 
(epimeleia) for their people. First of all, there should care for basic needs (3.2.1): 
“a general must see that his men are safe and are fed (τοῦτο ἔσται, οὕτω καὶ τὸν 
στρατηγὸν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ)”. In 3.2.3-4, the best leadership is performed in giving 
the right service to their voters’ best interests: “and all men fight in order that they 
may get the best life possible, and choose generals to guide them to it”; and arete is 
the essence of this right leadership, described as leading people to happiness: “By 
these reflections on what constitutes a good leader he stripped away all other virtues, 
and left just the power to make his followers happy” 22. The general characteristics 
21. Lac. 10.4. 
22. Mem. 3.2.4: “Καὶ οὕτως ἐπισκοπῶν τίς εἴη ἀγαθοῦ ἡγεμόνος ἀρετὴ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περιῄρει, κατέλειπε 
δὲ τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἡγῆται”.
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of virtue here discussed resemble those in Virtue’s speech in Mem. 2.1.20-33: virtue 
is essentially connected with epimeleia and leads to happiness. What is new here is 
the element of fine attunement to the needs of the people, as the good leader should 
understand what his people’s needs are in order to fulfill them to the best of his 
ability and hence lead them to happiness 23.
Agesilaus
Like Cyropaedia, Agesilaus presents Xenophon’s opinion on praise-worthy traits in 
kings. In Ages 3.1-2, 5, we see a glorification of the king for piety – a trait that makes 
him both honourable and trustworthy:
But now I will attempt to show the virtue that was in his soul (τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 
αὐτοῦ ἀρετήν), the virtue through which he wrought those deeds and loved all 
that is honourable and put away all that is base… Agesilaus had such reverence 
for religion, that even his enemies considered his oaths and his treaties more to be 
relied on than their own friendship with one another […] 24.
This description emphasized the king’s loyalty to treaties and oaths. This is 
important, since it elaborates on the role of commitment as the great virtue in the 
king’s soul. As we have previously noted, commitment and persistence are main 
characteristics in Xenophon’s descriptions of virtue. This section concludes with 
the words: “So much, then, for piety” (καὶ περὶ μὲν εὐσεβείας ταῦτα). Xenophon 
seems to have felt obliged to describe the king’s piety first, before describing his 
other virtues. This could be either because it was common to praise piety, or, more 
reasonably in the light of previous examples, because he saw piety as a foundational 
trait of virtue.
In Ages. 10.1-2, we are provided with a list of the king’s traits which Xenophon 
states to be praise-worthy:
Such, then, are the qualities for which I praise Agesilaus. […] The man who is fore-
most in endurance when the hour comes for toil, in valour when the contest calls 
for courage, in wisdom when the need is for counsel – he is the man, I think, who 
may fairly be regarded as the perfect embodiment of goodness. […] For who that 
imitates a pious, a just, a sober, a self-controlled man, can come to be unrighteous, 
unjust, violent, wanton ? In point of fact, Agesilaus prided himself less on reigning 
over others than on ruling himself, less on leading the people against their enemies 
than on guiding them to all virtue (ἐπὶ τῷ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἡγεῖσθαι).
23. This is in accord with the view that virtue for Xenophon is the knowledge of best means of reaching 
happiness; see Chernyakhovskaya 2014, 105. 
24. On Agesilaus’ friendship and xenia see Herman 1987, 1-3. 
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This list fits well with our categorical Virtue in Mem. 2.1: it mentions the king’s 
excellence in endurance, piety, self control and self rule, with the addition of: courage, 
wisdom, justice and soberness. Virtue is connected with leadership – in both cases, 
the leadership of people is essentially connected with the leader’s ability to rule 
himself  25.
Cyropaedia
After Cyrus is appointed to command the Persian army upon Cyaxares’ request, his 
first deed is consulting the gods (Cyr. 1.5.6). In 1.5.7-9 Cyrus makes his first speech 
to his men, referring to virtue in the following words:
And yet I think that no virtue is practised by men except with the aim that the 
good, by being such, may have something more than the bad; and I believe that 
those who abstain from present pleasures do this not that they may never enjoy 
themselves, but by this self-restraint they prepare themselves to have many times 
greater enjoyment in time to come (1.5.9).
Virtue is clearly expressed here through the practice of enkrateia, and bears a 
promise for happiness. Now Cyrus sets to give examples of different technai that 
are practiced by men: if the practice is for a good cause – their practice is virtuous:
And those who are eager to become able speakers study oratory, not that they may 
never cease from speaking eloquently, but in the hope that by their eloquence they 
may persuade men and accomplish great good. And those also who practise mili-
tary science undergo this labour, not that they may never cease from fighting, but 
because they think that by gaining proficiency in the arts of war they will secure great 
wealth and happiness and honour both for themselves and for their country (1.5.9).
Cyrus’ words to his peers in Cyr. 2.2.24 encourage excellence in them, through 
a description similar to that in Mem. 2.1.22-33:
And therefore the base oftentimes find a larger following of congenial spirits than 
the noble. For since vice makes her appeal through the pleasures of the moment, 
she has their assistance to persuade many to accept her views; but virtue, leading 
up hill (ἡ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ πρὸς ὄρθιον ἄγουσα), is not at all clever at attracting men at first 
sight and without reflection; and especially is this true, when there are others who 
call in the opposite direction, to what is downhill and easy (Cyr. 2.2.24).
25. Line 7 in Mem. 2.1 describes the self controlled person as “ikanos archein”; in order to be fit to 
rule, one must first learn to rule himself. A similar idea appears in Plato’s Republic 9.590d – in a 
virtuous society people must be governed, preferably by self rule: “[…] it is better for everyone to 
be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of 
that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because 
our governance and guidance are the same […]” (trans. Shorey 1935). 
Nili Alon Amit
146
The same ideas remain: virtue is maintained through hard work, is making less 
attractive promises than vice, but leads uphill or elevates man in different respects.
After placing a guard around Babylon in Cyr. 7.5.70, Cyrus ponders different 
ways of preserving and enlarging his empire. He comes to realize that his strength lies 
in his men’s virtue – their practice of virtue safeguard his empire: “and he realized 
that the brave men, who with the aid of the gods had brought him victory, must be 
kept together and that care must be exercised that they should not abandon their 
practice of virtue”. Here again – brave men are first aided by the gods (probably 
through their piety) and then practice virtue. What is this virtue which they prac-
tice? This is answered by Cyrus’ words to his men in the following lines (7.5.74-76):
As for the future, however, it is my judgment that if we turn to idleness and the 
luxurious self-indulgence of men of coarse natures, who count toil misery and 
living without toil happiness, we shall soon be of little account in our own eyes 
and shall soon lose all the blessings that we have. […] but, just as skill in other arts 
retrogrades if neglected, and as bodies, too, that were once in good condition change 
and deteriorate as soon as the owners relax into idleness, so also self-control and 
temperance and strength (οὕτω καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀλκή) will 
take a backward turn to vice as soon as one ceases to cultivate them. Therefore, 
we dare not become careless nor give ourselves up to the enjoyment of the present 
moment; for, while I think it is a great thing to have won an empire, it is a still greater 
thing to preserve it after it has been won. For to win falls often to the lot of one who 
has shown nothing but daring; but to win and hold – that is no longer a possibility 
without the exercise of self-control, temperance, and unflagging care (οὐκέτι τοῦτο 
ἄνευ σωφροσύνης οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ ἐγφρατείας οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας γίγνεται).
The threefold virtue: enkrateia, sophrosune and epimeleia repeats twice as virtues 
to be practiced; note the parallel between “strength” (ἀλκή) and “care” (ἐπιμελεία) 
in the lines marked in bold – it is evident that for Cyrus strength lies in the careful 
practice of virtue.
Cyrus continues his speech (7.5.78) with the importance of temperance and 
endurance in toil, in a similar manner to Socrates’ words to Aristippus in the 
beginning of Mem. 2.1: “Now the conditions of heat and cold, food and drink, toil 
and rest, we must share even with our slaves. But though we share with them, we 
must above all try to show ourselves their betters in such matters”. This practice, 
lastly, leads to happiness through freedom from appetite and laziness 26.
26. Cyr. 7.5.79-80: “But the science and practice of war we need not share at all with those whom we 
wish to put in the position of workmen or tributaries to us, but we must maintain our superiority 
in these accomplishments, as we recognize in these the means to liberty and happiness that the 
gods have given to men… But if any one is revolving in his mind any such questions as this – ‘of 




Cynegeticus, as previously mentioned, is an interesting case where the virtue of 
hunters is praised, which may show that Xenophon was interested in the general 
practice of virtue and not merely in glorifying the virtue of great men 27. Cyn. 12.15 
makes the following distinction between two classes of men:
Those, then, who have given themselves up to continual toil and learning hold for 
their own portion laborious lessons and exercises, but they hold safety for their 
cities. But if any decline to receive instruction because of the labour and prefer to 
live among untimely pleasures, they are by nature utterly evil. […] Now the better 
sort are those who are willing to toil 28.
After this prologue, Xenophon identifies hunters as members of the noble class 
who are characterized by virtue (12.18-19): “For among the ancients the companions 
of Cheiron to whom I referred learnt many noble lessons in their youth, beginning 
with hunting; from these lessons there sprang in them great virtue, for which they 
are admired even today”. Here again virtue is described as a willful object of pursuit, 
essentially connected with toil: “That all desire Virtue is obvious, but because they 
must toil if they are to gain her, the many fall away. For the achievement of her is 
hidden in obscurity, whereas the toils inseparable from her are manifest”.
Further in section 21 virtue seems to be personified again, or rather deified:
But in the presence of Virtue men do many evil and ugly things, supposing that they 
are not regarded by her because they do not see her. Yet she is present everywhere 
because she is immortal, and she honours those who are good to her, but casts off 
the bad. Therefore, if men knew that she is watching them, they would be impatient 
to undergo the toils and the discipline by which she is hardly to be captured, and 
would achieve her (12, 21-22).
This deification goes far beyond the basic constituents of virtue which we 
encountered in this present analysis: virtue in this instance is attributed with the 
godly powers of providence, punishment and reward. Other elements associated 
with virtue exceeding our basic category, which we encountered in our reading, 
are wisdom, courage, justice and soberness (Ages. 10.1-2). There may be a Platonic 
influence in this mention of the cardinal virtues of Republic IV 29.
hunger and thirst, toil and care’ – he must take this lesson to heart: that good things bring the 
greater pleasure, in proportion to the toil one undergoes beforehand to attain them; for toil gives 
a relish to good things […]”.
27. Cf. Gray 2011, 5.
28. Cyn. 12.15;17. See note 21.
29. The treatment of sophrosune as cardinal virtue goes back to Heraclitus, e. g. fragment 112 (Stobaeus, 
Anthology, 3, 1, 178): “Temperance is the highest virtue, and wisdom is to speak truth and consciously 
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Preceding Virtue’s personification in Mem. 2.1, Socrates quotes from Hesiod’s 
Works and Days (286) on the arduous human path to the divine summit of virtue 30. 
The connection to Xenophon’s main constituents of virtue here discussed is evident. 
Lines 293-380 in Works and Days, directly following those quoted by Xenophon’s 
Socrates, parallel Socrates’ aim in shaking Aristippus out of his indulgent and lazy 
life; Hesiod is trying his best to show his brother Perses that piety, epimeleia and 
effort are the divine order for man’s well being: “Both gods and men are angry with 
a man who lives idle” 31; “Through work men grow rich in flocks and substance, and 
working they are much better loved by the immortals” 32; “Work is no disgrace: it 
is idleness which is a disgrace” 33; “If your heart within you desires wealth, do these 
things and work with work upon work” 34.
Hesiod’s “work” has a value in itself, not merely by its product but generally by 
its essence. This idea is engrained in Xenophon’s category of virtue: virtue has to 
do with work and effort, and its product is in its practice. It seems fair to conclude, 
all in all, that the elements described by the mythic Virtue in Mem. 2.1 generally 
encompass Xenophon’s conception of virtue: it is a category constituting self rule, 
temperance and attentive care; it is trained physically by endurance and toil, and 
mentally by gaining a positive attitude toward endurance and toil; and it leads to 
happiness, not as an end goal but as a product of positive attitude during the process 
itself. The final lines of Memorabilia are a summary of Socrates’ virtues, ending with 
the fact that he was truly good – and truly happy 35.
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to act according to nature (σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη· καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ 
φύσιν ἐπαίοντας)”.
30. See p. 140 above. 
31. Hesiod, Works and Days, 303-304 (trans. Evelyn-White 1914 as for the following lines).
32. Hesiod, Works and Days, 308-309.
33. Hesiod, Works and Days, 311.
34. Hesiod, Works and Days, 381-382.
35. Mem. 4.8.11: “To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be (ἐδόκει 
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